Patrick Wintour has written an excellent precis of the IPPR proposals for civil service reform. I have added my thoughts in blue. Obviously my criticisms are directed at the IPPR report not at Patrick Wintour.
The prime minister should be given the power to appoint the most senior civil servants who run Whitehall departments, a government-commissioned report has recommended.
We do not need more Prime Ministerial power. A formal proposal of this kind will destroy party political system and move towards a presidential system. It is incredible that a constitutional move of this kind should be finessed without very wide consultation, a constitutional commission and a referendum.
The IPPR thinktank also recommends providing ministers with a larger "extended office" that would be made up of mixture of political advisers and non-partisan outside experts, as well as career civil servants.
The executive is too powerful as it is. We have effectively slipped, over the past forty years, into government by the executive rubber-stamped by Parliament. This is not democratic and certainly not what the ordinary people want (elected dictators can all too easily mutate into unelected ones).
The report ordered by the Cabinet Office minister, Francis Maude, suggests there is cross-party frustration at aspects of civil service accountability. Maude gave the report a strong welcome, and it is likely at the very least to be the basis for the next stage of his reform agenda.
Accountability across the board is the issue – civil servants accountable to ministers; ministers accountable to Parliament; MPs accountable to their constituency associations and the electorate. More powers of recall, impeachment and prosecution for misconduct in public office. And is it so unreasonable to ask for members of the House of Lords to be at least partly accountable – perhaps to the territorial communities they nominate in their titles.
In a proposal that would change the Whitehall accountability structure, the prime minister would appoint the senior permanent secretary posts on four-year terms, drawing on a list prepared by the civil service commission and reflecting the views of the relevant secretary of state. At present the appointment is made by the civil service commission, and the prime minister has a veto.
Hmm, this seems to be a slight of hand. The Prime Minister is already Minister for the Civil Service. A big problem with the present system is that civil servants owe their loyalty to the Prime Minister not to the departmental minister they are supposed to serve (as the scriptures advise us: a man cannot serve two masters).
The report also suggests the head of the civil service should be made a full-time post, and be responsible for line-managing and holding permanent secretaries accountable for their performance. The current civil service chief, Sir Bob Kerslake, is also a departmental permanent secretary.
These are weasel words (the report is weaselly, not Patrick Wintour). Is the Head of the Civil Service going to behave any differently than from the Cabinet Secretary? These people are too powerful and also highly political individuals – they are permanent politicians rather than permanent civil servants (which is why we see the same old policies whatever the change in government).
The report also proposes that senior officials responsible for the delivery of government programmes should be directly accountable to relevant departmental select committees in parliament in their own right, and not just as spokespeople for their ministers. At present many civil servants hide behind the doctrine of ministerial accountability to refuse to answer questions in a straightforward way.
No, this is the wrong way to go about things. We want a system where Parliament decides policies and the civil servants carry them out. Not just accepting that the executive is running the country and Parliament is merely a pompous pontificating rubber stamp.
In another groundbreaking suggestion it proposes civil servants should second officials to opposition parties ahead of elections in order to help them with policy development. At present civil servants a few months out from an election merely have a conversation with the opposition to familiarise themselves with its thinking, but not to give very specific advice.
No. I don’t want this. This is too close to creating a permanent elite that carries on in power despite elections that chucks parties out.
The recommendations, which are based on a study of leading international civil service systems, including countries such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada, will be scrutinised to see if they undermine the political independence of the civil service.
The civil service is not independent – it is highly political and often pursues “department” policies whatever the changes in government.
The direct prime ministerial appointment of Whitehall permanent secretaries may be seen as liable to undermine the authority of the head of the civil service. The proposals may also prompt claims that civil servants will feel accountable to politicians and not to their internal leadership.
Weasel words. Civil servants already owe their loyalty to the Minister for the Civil Service (who is always the Prime Minister). If there is a clash between a minister and his/her civil servants the civil servants often go directly to the Cabinet Secretary who raises it with the Prime Minister to get the department minister over-ruled – this must stop.
But many politicians argue that in practice senior civil servants quit if it is seen their face does not fit with a new political regime, and it is better for both sides to have a more explicit relationship in which civil servants are more directly accountable to their elected political masters.
They need to be directly accountable to their department ministers who need to be directly accountable to Parliament (which needs to be MUCH more accountable to the electorate on an on-going basis).
Reforms have been made to the appointment of permanent secretaries in recent months to give the elected secretary of state greater input, but these proposed reforms by handing responsibility to the prime minister go substantially further.
Secretaries of State are not elected they are appointed by the Prime Minister. I would like to see them selected by the parties. That would also re-engage the party system, as party members would have real influence.
The former home office minister, Nick Herbert, said: "This report itself shows the benefits of reform – going outside the civil service for policy advice has produced suggestions for more effective government that simply wouldn't have come from within.
Policy advice must come from Parliament not from “outside”.
"These ideas are a welcome step forward but we need to go further to create proper accountability and bring in external expertise. The risk isn't politicisation – it's today's suboptimal administration that doesn't answer to anyone."
Accountability must be to the people through their directly elected representatives in Parliament.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2013/jun/17/prime-minister-appoint-civil-servants
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/accountability-and-responsiveness-in-the-senior-civil-service
The prime minister should be given the power to appoint the most senior civil servants who run Whitehall departments, a government-commissioned report has recommended.
We do not need more Prime Ministerial power. A formal proposal of this kind will destroy party political system and move towards a presidential system. It is incredible that a constitutional move of this kind should be finessed without very wide consultation, a constitutional commission and a referendum.
The IPPR thinktank also recommends providing ministers with a larger "extended office" that would be made up of mixture of political advisers and non-partisan outside experts, as well as career civil servants.
The executive is too powerful as it is. We have effectively slipped, over the past forty years, into government by the executive rubber-stamped by Parliament. This is not democratic and certainly not what the ordinary people want (elected dictators can all too easily mutate into unelected ones).
The report ordered by the Cabinet Office minister, Francis Maude, suggests there is cross-party frustration at aspects of civil service accountability. Maude gave the report a strong welcome, and it is likely at the very least to be the basis for the next stage of his reform agenda.
Accountability across the board is the issue – civil servants accountable to ministers; ministers accountable to Parliament; MPs accountable to their constituency associations and the electorate. More powers of recall, impeachment and prosecution for misconduct in public office. And is it so unreasonable to ask for members of the House of Lords to be at least partly accountable – perhaps to the territorial communities they nominate in their titles.
In a proposal that would change the Whitehall accountability structure, the prime minister would appoint the senior permanent secretary posts on four-year terms, drawing on a list prepared by the civil service commission and reflecting the views of the relevant secretary of state. At present the appointment is made by the civil service commission, and the prime minister has a veto.
Hmm, this seems to be a slight of hand. The Prime Minister is already Minister for the Civil Service. A big problem with the present system is that civil servants owe their loyalty to the Prime Minister not to the departmental minister they are supposed to serve (as the scriptures advise us: a man cannot serve two masters).
The report also suggests the head of the civil service should be made a full-time post, and be responsible for line-managing and holding permanent secretaries accountable for their performance. The current civil service chief, Sir Bob Kerslake, is also a departmental permanent secretary.
These are weasel words (the report is weaselly, not Patrick Wintour). Is the Head of the Civil Service going to behave any differently than from the Cabinet Secretary? These people are too powerful and also highly political individuals – they are permanent politicians rather than permanent civil servants (which is why we see the same old policies whatever the change in government).
The report also proposes that senior officials responsible for the delivery of government programmes should be directly accountable to relevant departmental select committees in parliament in their own right, and not just as spokespeople for their ministers. At present many civil servants hide behind the doctrine of ministerial accountability to refuse to answer questions in a straightforward way.
No, this is the wrong way to go about things. We want a system where Parliament decides policies and the civil servants carry them out. Not just accepting that the executive is running the country and Parliament is merely a pompous pontificating rubber stamp.
In another groundbreaking suggestion it proposes civil servants should second officials to opposition parties ahead of elections in order to help them with policy development. At present civil servants a few months out from an election merely have a conversation with the opposition to familiarise themselves with its thinking, but not to give very specific advice.
No. I don’t want this. This is too close to creating a permanent elite that carries on in power despite elections that chucks parties out.
The recommendations, which are based on a study of leading international civil service systems, including countries such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada, will be scrutinised to see if they undermine the political independence of the civil service.
The civil service is not independent – it is highly political and often pursues “department” policies whatever the changes in government.
The direct prime ministerial appointment of Whitehall permanent secretaries may be seen as liable to undermine the authority of the head of the civil service. The proposals may also prompt claims that civil servants will feel accountable to politicians and not to their internal leadership.
Weasel words. Civil servants already owe their loyalty to the Minister for the Civil Service (who is always the Prime Minister). If there is a clash between a minister and his/her civil servants the civil servants often go directly to the Cabinet Secretary who raises it with the Prime Minister to get the department minister over-ruled – this must stop.
But many politicians argue that in practice senior civil servants quit if it is seen their face does not fit with a new political regime, and it is better for both sides to have a more explicit relationship in which civil servants are more directly accountable to their elected political masters.
They need to be directly accountable to their department ministers who need to be directly accountable to Parliament (which needs to be MUCH more accountable to the electorate on an on-going basis).
Reforms have been made to the appointment of permanent secretaries in recent months to give the elected secretary of state greater input, but these proposed reforms by handing responsibility to the prime minister go substantially further.
Secretaries of State are not elected they are appointed by the Prime Minister. I would like to see them selected by the parties. That would also re-engage the party system, as party members would have real influence.
The former home office minister, Nick Herbert, said: "This report itself shows the benefits of reform – going outside the civil service for policy advice has produced suggestions for more effective government that simply wouldn't have come from within.
Policy advice must come from Parliament not from “outside”.
"These ideas are a welcome step forward but we need to go further to create proper accountability and bring in external expertise. The risk isn't politicisation – it's today's suboptimal administration that doesn't answer to anyone."
Accountability must be to the people through their directly elected representatives in Parliament.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2013/jun/17/prime-minister-appoint-civil-servants
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/accountability-and-responsiveness-in-the-senior-civil-service
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